This manual cannot teach anyone how to be, or become, a good
interrogator. At best it can help readers to avoid the
characteristic mistakes of poor interrogators.
Its purpose is to provide guidelines for KUBARK interrogation,
and particularly the counterintelligence interrogation of
resistant sources. Designed as an aid for interrogators and
others immediately concerned, it is based largely upon the
published results of extensive research, including scientific
inquiries conducted by specialists in closely related subjects.
There is nothing mysterious about interrogation. It consists
of no more than obtaining needed information through responses to
questions. As is true of all craftsmen, some interrogators are
more able than others; and some of their superiority may be
innate. But sound interrogation nevertheless rests upon a
knowledge of the subject matter and on certain broad principles,
chiefly psychological, which are not hard to understand. The
success of good interrogators depends in large measure upon their
use, conscious or not, of these principles and of processes and
techniques deriving from them. Knowledge of subject matter and of
the basic principles will not of itself create a successful
interrogation, but it will make possible the avoidance of
mistakes that are characteristic of poor interrogation. The
purpose, then, is not to teach the reader how to be a good
interrogator but rather to tell him what he must learn in order
to become a good interrogator.
The interrogation of a resistant source who is a staff or
agent member of an Orbit intelligence or security service or of a
clandestine Communist organization is one of the most exacting of
professional tasks. Usually the odds still favor the
interrogator, but they are sharply cut by the training,
experience, patience and toughness of the interrogatee. In such
circumstances the interrogator needs all the help that he can
get. And a principal source of aid today is scientific findings.
The intelligence service which is able to bring pertinent, modern
knowledge to bear upon its problems enjoys huge advantages over a
service which conducts its clandestine business in eighteenth
century fashion. It is true that American psychologists have
devoted somewhat more attention to Communist interrogation
techniques, particularly "brainwashing", than to U. S.
practices. Yet they have conducted scientific inquiries into many
subjects that are closely related to interrogation: the effects
of debility and isolation, the polygraph, reactions to pain and
fear, hypnosis and heightened suggestibility, narcosis, etc. This
work is of sufficient importance and relevance that it is no
longer possible to discuss interrogation significantly without
reference to the psychological research conducted in the past
decade. For this reason a major purpose of this study is to focus
relevant scientific findings upon CI interrogation. Every effort
has been made to report and interpret these findings in our own
language, in place of the terminology employed by the
psychologists.
This study is by no means confined to a resume and
interpretation of psychological findings. The approach of the
psychologists is customarily manipulative; that is, they suggest
methods of imposing controls or alterations upon the interrogatee
from the outside. Except within the Communist frame of reference,
they have paid less attention to the creation of internal
controls -- i.e., conversion of the source, so that voluntary
cooperation results. Moral considerations aside, the imposition
of external techniques of manipulating people carries with it the
grave risk of later lawsuits, adverse publicity, or other
attempts to strike back.
Contents
B. Explanation of Organization
This study moves from the general topic of interrogation per se
(Parts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI)
to planning the counterintelligence interrogation (Part
VII) to the CI interrogation of resistant sources (Parts VIII, IX, and X).
The definitions, legal considerations, and discussions of
interrogators and sources, as well as Section VI on screening and
other preliminaries, are relevant to all kinds of interrogations.
Once it is established that the source is probably a
counterintelligence target (in other words, is probably a member
of a foreign intelligence or security service, a Communist, or a
part of any other group engaged in clandestine activity directed
against the national security), the interrogation is planned and
conducted accordingly. The CI interrogation techniques are
discussed in an order of increasing intensity as the focus on
source resistance grows sharper. The last section, on do's and
dont's, is a return to the broader view of the opening parts; as
a check-list, it is placed last solely for convenience.
Contents
Most of the intelligence terminology employed here which may once
have been ambiguous has been clarified through usage or through
KUBARK instructions. For this reason definitions have been
omitted for such terms as burn notice, defector, escapee, and
refugee. Other definitions have been included despite a common
agreement about meaning if the significance is shaded by the
context.
1. Assessment: the analysis and synthesis of
information, usually about a person or persons, for the purpose
of appraisal. The assessment of individuals is based upon the
compilation and use of psychological as well as biographic
detail.
2. Bona fides: evidence or reliable information about
identity, personal (including intelligence) history, and
intentions or good faith.
3. Control: the capacity to generate, alter, or halt
human behavior by implying, citing, or using physical or
psychological means to ensure compliance with direction. The
compliance may be voluntary or involuntary. Control of an
interrogatee can rarely be established without control of his
environment.
4. Counterintelligence interrogation: an interrogation
(see #7) designed to obtain information about hostile clandestine
activities and persons or groups engaged therein. KUBARK CI
interrogations are designed, almost invariably, to yield
information about foreign intelligence and security services or
Communist organizations. Because security is an element of
counterintelligence, interrogations conducted to obtain
admissions of clandestine plans or activities directed against
KUBARK or PBPRIME security are also CI interrogations. But unlike
a police interrogation, the CI interrogation is not aimed at
causing the interrogatee to incriminate himself as a means of
bringing him to trial. Admissions of complicity are not, to a CI
service, ends in themselves but merely preludes to the
acquisition of more information.
5. Debriefing: obtaining information by questioning a
controlled and witting source who is normally a willing one.
6. Eliciting: obtaining information, without revealing
intent or exceptional interest, through a verbal or written
exchange with a person who may be willing or unwilling to provide
what is sought and who may or may not be controlled.
7. Interrogation: obtaining information by direct
questioning of a person or persons under conditions which are
either partly or fully controlled by the questioner or are
believed by those questioned to be subject to his control.
Because interviewing, debriefing, and eliciting are simpler
methods of obtaining information from cooperative subjects,
interrogation is usually reserved for sources who are suspect,
resistant, or both.
8. Intelligence interview: obtaining information, not
customarily under controlled conditions, by questioning a person
who is aware of the nature and perhaps of the significance of his
answers but who is ordinarily unaware of the purposes and
specific intelligence affiliations of the interviewer.
Contents
The legislation which founded KUBARK specifically denied it any
law-enforcement or police powers. Yet detention in a controlled
environment and perhaps for a lengthy period is frequently
essential to a successful counterintelligence interrogation of a
recalcitrant source. [approx. three lines deleted] This
necessity, obviously, should be determined as early as possible.
The legality of detaining and questioning a person, and of the
methods employed, [approx. 10 lines deleted]
Detention poses the most common of the legal problems. KUBARK
has no independent legal authority to detain anyone against his
will, [approx. 4 lines deleted] The haste in which some KUBARK
interrogations have been conducted has not always been the
product of impatience. Some security services, especially those
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, may work at leisure, depending upon time
as well as their own methods to melt recalcitrance. KUBARK
usually cannot. Accordingly, unless it is considered that the
prospective interrogatee is cooperative and will remain so
indefinitely, the first step in planning an interrogation is to
determine how long the source can be held. The choice of methods
depends in part upon the answer to this question.
[approx. 15 lines deleted]
The handling and questioning of defectors are subject to the
provisions of [one or two words deleted] Directive No. 4: to its
related Chief/KUBARK Directives, principally [approx. 1/2 line
deleted] Book Dispatch [one or two words deleted] and to
pertinent [one or two words deleted]. Those concerned with the
interrogation of defectors, escapees, refugees, or repatriates
should know these references.
The kinds of counterintelligence information to be sought in a
CI interrogation are stated generally in Chief/KUBARK Directive
and in greater detail in Book Dispatch [approx. 1/3 line
deleted].
The interrogation of PBPRIME citizens poses special problems.
First, such interrogations should not be conducted for reasons
lying outside the sphere of KUBARK' s responsibilities. For
example, the [approx. 2/3 line deleted] but should not normally
become directly involved. Clandestine activity conducted abroad
on behalf of a foreign power by a private PBPRIME citizens does
fall within KUBARK's investigative and interrogative
responsibilities. However, any investigation, interrogation, or
interview of a PBPRIME citizen which is conducted abroad because
it be known or suspected that he is engaged in clandestine
activities directed against PBPRIME security interests requires
the prior and personal approval of Chief/KUDESK or of his deputy.
Since 4 October 1961, extraterritorial application has been
given to the Espionage Act, making it henceforth possible to
prosecute in the Federal Courts any PBPRIME citizen who violates
the statutes of this Act in foreign countries. ODENVY has
requested that it be informed, in advance if time permits, if any
investigative steps are undertaken in these cases. Since KUBARK
employees cannot be witnesses in court, each investigation must
be conducted in such a manner that evidence obtained may be
properly introduced if the case comes to trial. [approx. 1 line
deleted] states policy and procedures for the conduct of
investigations of PBPRIME citizens abroad.
Interrogations conducted under compulsion or duress are
especially likely to involve illegality and to entail damaging
consequences for KUBARK. Therefore prior Headquarters approval at
the KUDOVE level must be obtained for the interrogation of any
source against his will and under any of the following
circumstances:
1. If bodily harm is to be inflicted.
2. If medical, chemical, or electrical methods or materials
are to be used to induce acquiescence.
3. [approx. 3 lines deleted]
The CI interrogator dealing with an uncooperative interrogatee
who has been well-briefed by a hostile service on the legal
restrictions under which ODYOKE services operate must expect some
effective delaying tactics. The interrogatee has been told that
KUBARK will not hold him long, that he need only resist for a
while. Nikolay KHOKHLOV, for example, reported that before he
left for Frankfurt am Main on his assassination mission, the
following thoughts coursed through his head: "If I should
get into the hands of Western authorities, I can become reticent,
silent, and deny my voluntary visit to Okolovich. I know I will
not be tortured and that under the procedures of western law I
can conduct myself boldly." (17) [The footnote numerals in
this text are keyed to the numbered bibliography at the end.] The
interrogator who encounters expert resistance should not grow
flurried and press; if he does, he is likelier to commit illegal
acts which the source can later use against him. Remembering that
time is on his side, the interrogator should arrange to get as
much of it as he needs.
Contents
A number of studies of interrogation discuss qualities said to be
desirable in an interrogator. The list seems almost endless - a
professional manner, forcefulness, understanding and sympathy,
breadth of general knowledge, area knowledge, "a practical
knowledge of psychology", skill in the tricks of the trade,
alertness, perseverance, integrity, discretion, patience, a high
I.Q., extensive experience, flexibility, etc., etc. Some texts
even discuss the interrogator's manners and grooming, and one
prescribed the traits considered desirable in his secretary.
A repetition of this catalogue would serve no purpose here,
especially because almost all of the characteristics mentioned
are also desirable in case officers, agents, policemen, salesmen,
lumberjacks, and everybody else. The search of the pertinent
scientific literature disclosed no reports of studies based on
common denominator traits of successful interrogators or any
other controlled inquiries that would invest these lists with any
objective validity.
Perhaps the four qualifications of chief importance to the
interrogator are (1) enough operational training and experience
to permit quack recognition of leads; (2) real familiarity with
the language to be used; (3) extensive background knowledge about
the interrogatee's native country (and intelligence service, if
employed by one); and (4) a genuine understanding of the source
as a person.
[approx. 1/2 line deleted] stations, and even a few bases can
call upon one or several interrogators to supply these
prerequisites, individually or as a team. Whenever a number of
interrogators is available, the percentage of successes is
increased by careful matching of questioners and sources and by
ensuring that rigid prescheduling does not prevent such matching.
Of the four traits listed, a genuine insight into the source's
character and motives is perhaps most important but least common.
Later portions of this manual explore this topic in more detail.
One general observation is introduced now, however, because it is
considered basic to the establishment of rapport, upon which the
success of non-coercive interrogation depends.
The interrogator should remember that he and the interrogatee
are often working at cross-purposes not because the interrogates
is malevolently withholding or misleading but simply because what
he wants front the situation is not what the interrogator wants.
The interrogator's goal is to obtain useful information -- facts
about which the interrogatee presumably have acquired
information. But at the outset of the interrogation, and perhaps
for a long time afterwards, the person being questioned is not
greatly concerned with communicating his body of specialized
information to his questioner; he is concerned with putting his
best foot forward. The question uppermost in his mind, at the
beginning, is not likely to be "How can I help
PBPRIME?" but rather "What sort of impression am I
making?" and, almost immediately thereafter, "What is
going to happen to me now?" (An exception is the penetration
agent or provocateur sent to a KUBARK field installation after
training in withstanding interrogation. Such an agent may feel
confident enough not to be gravely concerned about himself. His
primary interest, from the beginning, may be the acquisition of
information about the interrogator and his service.)
The skilled interrogator can save a great deal of time by
understanding the emotional needs of the interrogates. Most
people confronted by an official -- and dimly powerful --
representative of a foreign power will get down to cases much
faster if made to feel, from the start, that they are being
treated as individuals. So simple a matter as greeting an
interrogatee by his name at the opening of the session
establishes in his mind the comforting awareness that he is
considered as a person, not a squeezable sponge. This is not to
say that egotistic types should be allowed to bask at length in
the warmth of individual recognition. But it is important to
assuage the fear of denigration which afflicts many people when
first interrogated by making it clear that the individuality of
the interrogatee is recognized. With this common understanding
established, the interrogation can move on to impersonal matters
and will not later be thwarted or interrupted -- or at least not
as often -- by irrelevant answers designed not to provide facts
but to prove that the interrogatee is a respectable member of the
human race.
Although it is often necessary to trick people into telling
what we need to know, especially in CI interrogations, the
initial question which the interrogator asks of himself should
be, "How can I make him want to tell me what he knows?"
rather than "How can I trap him into disclosing what he
knows?" If the person being questioned is genuinely hostile
for ideological reasons, techniques of manipulation are in order.
But the assumption of hostility -- or at least the use of
pressure tactics at the first encounter -- may make difficult
subjects even out of those who would respond to recognition of
individuality and an initial assumption of good will.
Another preliminary comment about the interrogator is that
normally he should not personalize. That is, he should not be
pleased, flattered, frustrated, goaded, or otherwise emotionally
and personally affected by the interrogation. A calculated
display of feeling employed for a specific purpose is an
exception; but even under these circumstances the interrogator is
in full control. The interrogation situation is intensely
inter-personal; it is therefore all the more necessary to strike
a counter-balance by an attitude which the subject clearly
recognizes as essentially fair and objective. The kind of person
who cannot help personalizing, who becomes emotionally involved
in the interrogation situation, may have chance (and even
spectacular) successes as an interrogator but is almost certain
to have a poor batting average.
It is frequently said that the interrogator should be "a
good judge of human nature." In fact, [approx. 3 lines
deleted] (3) This study states later (page "Great attention
has been given to the degree to which persons are able to make
judgements from casual observations regarding the personality
characteristics of another. The consensus of research is that
with respect to many kinds of judgments, at least some judges
perform reliably better than chance...." Nevertheless,
"... the level of reliability in judgments is so low that
research encounters difficulties when it seeks to determine who
makes better judgments...." (3) In brief, the interrogator
is likelier to overestimate his ability to judge others than to
underestimate it, especially if he has had little or no training
in modern psychology. It follows that errors in assessment and in
handling are likelier to result from snap judgments based upon
the assumption of innate skill in judging others than from
holding such judgments in abeyance until enough facts are known.
There has been a good deal of discussion of interrogation
experts vs. subject-matter experts. Such facts as are available
suggest that the latter have a slight advantage. But for
counterintelligence purposes the debate is academic. [approx. 5
lines deleted]
It is sound practice to assign inexperienced interrogators to
guard duty or to other supplementary tasks directly related to
interrogation, so that they can view the process closely before
taking charge. The use of beginning interrogators as screeners
(see part VI) is also recommended.
Although there is some limited validity in the view,
frequently expressed in interrogation primers, that the
interrogation is essentially a battle of wits, the CI
interrogator who encounters a skilled and resistant interrogatee
should remember that a wide variety of aids can be made available
in the field or from Headquarters. (These are discussed in Part VIII.) The intensely personal nature of the
interrogation situation makes it all the more necessary that the
KUBARK questioner should aim not for a personal triumph but for
his true goal -- the acquisition of all needed information by any
authorized means.
___________________
*The interrogator should be supported whenever possible by
qualified analysts' review of his daily "take";
experience has shown that such a review will raise questions to
be put and points to be clarified and lead to a thorough coverage
of the subject in hand.
Contents
A. Types Of Sources: Intelligence Categories
From the viewpoint of the intelligence service the categories
of persons who most frequently provide useful information in
response to questioning are travellers; repatriates; defectors,
escapees, and refugees; transferred sources; agents, including
provocateurs, double agents, and penetration agents; and
swindlers and fabricators.
1. Travellers are usually interviewed, debriefed, or
queried through eliciting techniques. If they are interrogated,
the reason is that they are known or believed to fall into one of
the following categories.
2. Repatriates are sometimes interrogated, although
other techniques are used more often. The proprietary interests
of the host government will frequently dictate interrogation by a
liaison service rather than by KUBARK. If KUBARK interrogates,
the following preliminary steps are taken:
a. A records check, including local and Headquarters traces.
b . Testing of bona fides .
c. Determination of repatriate's kind and level of access
while outside his own country.
d. Preliminary assessment of motivation (including political
orientation), reliability, and capability as observer and
reporter.
e. Determination of all intelligence or Communist
relationships, whether with a service or party of the
repatriate's own country, country of detention, or another. Full
particulars are needed.
3. Defectors, escapees, and refugees are normally interrogated
at sufficient length to permit at least a preliminary testing of
bona fides . The experience of the post-war years has
demonstrated that Soviet defectors (1) almost never defect solely
or primarily because of inducement by a Western service, (2)
usually leave the USSR for personal rather than ideological
reasons, and (3) are often RIS agents.
[approx. 9 lines deleted]
All analyses of the defector-refugee flow have shown that the
Orbit services are well-aware of the advantages offered by this
channel as a means of planting their agents in target countries.
[approx. 14 lines deleted]
4. Transferred sources referred to KUBARK by another
service
for interrogation are usually sufficiently well-known to the
transferring service so that a file has been opened. Whenever
possible, KUBARK should secure a copy of the file or its full
informational equivalent before accepting custody.
5. Agents are more frequently debriefed than
interrogated. [approx. 3 lines deleted] as an analytic tool. If
it is then established or strongly suspected that the agent
belongs to one of the following categories, further investigation
and, eventually, interrogation usually follow.
a. Provocateur. Many provocation agents are walk-ins
posing as escapees, refugees, or defectors in order to penetrate
emigre groups, ODYOKE intelligence, or other targets assigned by
hostile services. Although denunciations by genuine refugees and
other evidence of information obtained from documents, local
officials, and like sources may result in exposure, the detection
of provocation frequently depends upon skilled interrogation. A
later section of this manual deals with the preliminary testing
of bona fides . But the results of preliminary testing are often
inconclusive, and detailed interrogation is frequently essential
to confession and full revelation. Thereafter the provocateur may
be questioned for operational and positive intelligence as well
as counterintelligence provided that proper cognizance is taken
of his status during the questioning and later, when reports are
prepared.
b. Double agent. The interrogation of DA's frequently
follows a determination or strong suspicion that the double is
"giving the edge" to the adversary service. As is also
true for the interrogation of provocateurs, thorough preliminary
investigation will pay handsome dividends when questioning gets
under way. In fact, it is a basic principle of interrogation that
the questioner should have at his disposal, before querying
starts, as much pertinent information as can be gathered without
the knowledge of the prospective interrogatee.
[2/3 of page deleted]
d. Swindlers and fabricators are usually interrogated
for prophylactic reasons, not for counterintelligence
information. The purpose is the prevention or nullification of
damage to KUBARK, to other ODYOKE services Swindlers and
fabricators have little of CI significance to communicate but are
notoriously skillful timewasters. Interrogation of them is
usually inconclusive and, if prolonged, unrewarding. The
professional peddler with several IS contacts may prove an
exception; but he will usually give the edge to a host security
service because otherwise he cannot function with impunity.
Contents
B. Types of Sources: Personality Categories
The number of systems devised for categorizing human beings is
large, and most of them are of dubious validity. Various
categorical schemes are outlined in treatises on interrogation.
The two typologies most frequently advocated are
psychologic-emotional and geographic-cultural. Those who urge the
former argue that the basic emotional-psychological patterns do
not vary significantly with time, place, or culture. The latter
school maintains the existence of a national character and
sub-national categories, and interrogation guides based on this
principle recommend approaches tailored to geographical cultures.
It is plainly true that the interrogation source cannot be
understood in a vacuum, isolated from social context. It is
equally true that some of the most glaring blunders in
interrogation (and other operational processes ) have resulted
from ignoring the source's background. Moreover,
emotional-psychological schematizations sometimes present
atypical extremes rather than the kinds of people commonly
encountered by interrogators. Such typologies also cause
disagreement even among professional psychiatrists and
psychologists. Interrogators who adopt them and who note in an
interrogatee one or two of the characteristics of "Type
A" may mistakenly assign the source to Category A and assume
the remaining traits.
On the other hand, there are valid objections to the adoption
of cultural-geographic categories for interrogation purposes
(however valid they may be as KUCAGE concepts). The pitfalls of
ignorance of the distinctive culture of the source have
"[approx. 4 lines deleted]
[approx. 8 lines deleted]." (3)
The ideal solution would be to avoid all categorizing.
Basically, all schemes for labelling people are wrong per se;
applied arbitrarily, they always produce distortions. Every
interrogator knows that a real understanding of the individual is
worth far more than a thorough knowledge of this or that
pigeon-hole to which he has been consigned. And for interrogation
purposes the ways in which he differs from the abstract type may
be more significant than the ways in which he conforms.
But KUBARK does not dispose of the time or personnel to probe
the depths of each source's individuality. In the opening phases
of interrogation, or in a quick interrogation, we are compelled
to make some use of the shorthand of categorizing, despite
distortions. Like other interrogation aides, a scheme of
categories is useful only if recognized for what it is -- a set
of labels that facilitate communication but are not the same as
the persons thus labelled. If an interrogatee lies persistently,
an interrogator may report and dismiss him as a
"pathological liar." Yet such persons may possess
counterintelligence (or other) information quite equal in value
to that held by other sources, and the interrogator likeliest to
get at it is the man who is not content with labelling but is as
interested in why the subject lies as in what he lies about.
With all of these reservations, then, and with the further
observation that those who find these psychological-emotional
categories pragmatically valuable should use them and those who
do not should let them alone, the following nine types are
described. The categories are based upon the fact that a person's
past is always reflected, however dimily, in his present ethics
and behavior. Old dogs can learn new tricks but not new ways of
learning them. People do change, but what appears to be new
behavior or a new psychological pattern is usually just a variant
on the old theme.
It is not claimed that the classification system presented
here is complete; some interrogatees will not fit into any one of
the groupings. And like all other typologies, the system is
plagued by overlap, so that some interrogatees will show
characteristics of more than one group. Above all, the
interrogator must remember that finding some of the
characteristics of the group in a single source does not warrant
an immediate conclusion that the source "belongs to"
the group, and that even correct labelling is not the equivalent
of understanding people but merely an aid to understanding.
The nine major groups within the psychological-emotional
category adopted for this handbook are the following.
1. The orderly-obstinate character. People in this
category are characteristically frugal, orderly, and cold;
frequently they are quite intellectual. They are not impulsive in
behavior. They tend to think things through logically and to act
deliberately. They often reach decisions very slowly. They are
far less likely to make real personal sacrifices for a cause than
to use them as a temporary means of obtaining a permanent
personal gain. They are secretive and disinclined to confide in
anyone else their plans and plots, which frequently concern the
overthrow of some form of authority. They are also stubborn,
although they may pretend cooperation or even believe that they
are cooperating. They nurse grudges.
The orderly-obstinate character considers himself superior to
other people. Sometimes his sense of superiority is interwoven
with a kind of magical thinking that includes all sorts of
superstitions and fantasies about controlling his environment. He
may even have a system of morality that is all his own. He
sometimes gratifies his feeling of secret superiority by
provoking unjust treatment. He also tries, characteristically, to
keep open a line of escape by avoiding any real commitment to
anything. He is -- and always has been -- intensely concerned
about his personal possessions. He is usually a tightwad who
saves everything, has a strong sense of propriety, and is
punctual and tidy. His money and other possessions have for him a
personalized quality; they are parts of himself. He often carries
around shiny coins, keepsakes, a bunch of keys, and other objects
having for himself an actual or symbolic value.
Usually the orderly-obstinate character has a history of
active rebellion in childhood, of persistently doing the exact
opposite of what he is told to do. As an adult he may have
learned to cloak his resistance and become passive-aggressive,
but his determination to get his own way is unaltered. He has
merely learned how to proceed indirectly if necessary. The
profound fear and hatred of authority, persisting since
childhood, is often well-concealed in adulthood, For example,
such a person may confess easily and quickly under interrogation,
even to acts that he did not commit, in order to throw the
interrogator off the trail of a significant discovery (or, more
rarely, because of feelings of guilt).
The interrogator who is dealing with an orderly-obstinate
character should avoid the role of hostile authority. Threats and
threatening gestures, table-pounding, pouncing on evasions or
lies, and any similarly authoritative tactics will only awaken in
such a subject his old anxieties and habitual defense mechanisms.
To attain rapport, the interrogator should be friendly. It will
probably prove rewarding if the room and the interrogator look
exceptionally neat. Orderly-obstinate interrogatees often collect
coins or other objects as a hobby; time spent in sharing their
interests may thaw some of the ice. Establishing rapport is
extremely important when dealing with this type. [approx 3 lines
deleted] (3)
2. The optimistic character. This kind of source is
almost constantly happy-go-lucky, impulsive, inconsistent, and
undependable. He seems to enjoy a continuing state of well-being.
He may be generous to a fault, giving to others as he wants to be
given to. He may become an alcoholic or drug addict. He is not
able to withstand very much pressure; he reacts to a challenge
not by increasing his efforts but rather by running away to avoid
conflict. His convictions that "something will turn
up", that "everything will work out all right", is
based on his need to avoid his own responsibility for events and
depend upon a kindly fate.
Such a person has usually had a great deal of over-indulgence
in early life. He is sometimes the youngest member of a large
family, the child of a middle-aged woman (a so-called
"change-of-life baby"). If he has met severe
frustrations in later childhood, he may be petulant, vengeful,
and constantly demanding.
As interrogation sources, optimistic characters respond best
to a kindly, parental approach. If withholding, they can often be
handled effectively by the Mutt-and-Jeff technique discussed
later in this paper. Pressure tactics or hostility will make them
retreat inside themselves, whereas reassurance will bring them
out. They tend to seek promises, to cast the interrogator in the
role of protector and problem-solver; and it is important that
the interrogator avoid making any specific promises that cannot
be fulfilled, because the optimist turned vengeful is likely to
prove troublesome.
3. The greedy, demanding character. This kind of person
affixes himself to others like a leech and clings obsessively.
Although extremely dependent and passive, he constantly demands
that others take care of him and gratify his wishes. If he
considers himself wronged, he does not seek redress through his
own efforts but tries to persuade another to take up the cudgels
in his behalf -- "let's you and him fight." His
loyalties are likely to shift whenever he feels that the sponsor
whom he has chosen has let him down. Defectors of this type feel
aggrieved because their desires were not satisfied in their
countries of origin, but they soon feel equally deprived in a
second land and turn against its government or representatives in
the same way. The greedy and demanding character is subject to
rather frequent depressions. He may direct a desire for revenge
inward, upon himself; in extreme cases suicide may result.
The greedy, demanding character often suffered from very early
deprivation of affection or security. As an adult he continues to
seek substitute parents who will care for him as his own, he
feels, did not.
The interrogator dealing with a greedy, demanding character
must be careful not to rebuff him; otherwise rapport will be
destroyed. On the other hand, the interrogator must not accede to
demands which cannot or should not be met. Adopting the tone of
an understanding father or big brother is likely to make the
subject responsive. If he makes exorbitant requests, an
unimportant favor may provide a satisfactory substitute because
the demand arises not from a specific need but as an expression
of the subject's need for security. He is likely to find
reassuring any manifestation of concern for his well-being.
In dealing with this type -- and to a
considerable extent in dealing with any of the types herein
listed -- the interrogator must be aware of the limits and
pitfalls of rational persuasion. If he seeks to induce
cooperation by an appeal to logic, he should first determine
whether the source's resistance is based on logic. The appeal
will glance off ineffectually if the resistance is totally or
chiefly emotional rather than rational. Emotional resistance can
be dissipated only by emotional manipulation.
4. The anxious, self-centered character.
Although this person is fearful, he is engaged in a constant
struggle to conceal his fears. He is frequently a daredevil who
compensates for his anxiety by pretending that there is no such
thing as danger. He may be a stunt flier or circus performer who
"proves" himself before crowds. He may also be a Don
Juan. He tends to brag and often lies through hunger for approval
or praise. As a soldier or officer he may have been decorated for
bravery; but if so, his comrades may suspect that his exploits
resulted from a pleasure in exposing himself to danger and the
anticipated delights of rewards, approval, and applause. The
anxious, self-centered character is usually intensely vain and
equally sensitive.
People who show these characteristics are
actually unusually fearful. The causes of intense concealed
anxiety are too complex and subtle to permit discussion of the
subject in this paper.
Of greater importance to the interrogator than
the causes is the opportunity provided by concealed anxiety for
successful manipulation of the source. His desire to impress will
usually be quickly evident. He is likely to be voluble. Ignoring
or ridiculing his bragging, or cutting him short with a demand
that he get down to cases, is likely to make him resentful and to
stop the flow. Playing upon his vanity, especially by praising
his courage, will usually be a successful tactic if employed
skillfully. Anxious, self-centered interrogatees who are
withholding significant facts, such as contact with a hostile
service, are likelier to divulge if made to feel that the truth
will not be used to harm them and if the interrogator also
stresses the callousness and stupidity of the adversary in
sending so valiant a person upon so ill-prepared a mission. There
is little to be gained and much to be lost by exposing the
nonrelevant lies of this kind of source. Gross lies about deeds
of daring, sexual prowess, or other "proofs" of courage
and manliness are best met with silence or with friendly but
noncommittal replies unless they consume an inordinate amount of
time. If operational use is contemplated, recruitment may
sometimes be effected through such queries as, "I wonder if
you would be willing to undertake a dangerous mission."
5. The guilt-ridden character. This kind
of person has a strong cruel, unrealistic conscience. His whole
life seems devoted to reliving his feelings of guilt. Sometimes
he seems determined to atone; at other times he insists that
whatever went wrong is the fault of somebody else. In either
event he seeks constantly some proof or external indication that
the guilt of others is greater than his own. He is often caught
up completely in efforts to prove that he has been treated
unjustly. In fact, he may provoke unjust treatment in order to
assuage his conscience through punishment. Compulsive gamblers
who find no real pleasure in winning but do find relief in losing
belong to this class. So do persons who falsely confess to
crimes. Sometimes such people actually commit crimes in order to
confess and be punished. Masochists also belong in this category.
The causes of most guilt complexes are real or
fancied wrongs done to parents or others whom the subject felt he
ought to love and honor. As children such people may have been
frequently scolded or punished. Or they may have been
"model" children who repressed all natural hostilities.
The guilt-ridden character is hard to
interrogate. He may "confess" to hostile clandestine
activity, or other acts of interest to KUBARK, in which he was
not involved. Accusations levelled at him by the interrogator are
likely to trigger such false confessions. Or he may remain silent
when accused, enjoying the "punishment." He is a poor
subject for LCFLUTTER. The complexities of dealing with
conscience-ridden interrogatees vary so widely from case to case
that it is almost impossible to list sound general principles.
Perhaps the best advice is that the interrogator, once alerted by
information from the screening process (see Part
VI) or by the subject's excessive preoccupation with moral
judgements, should treat as suspect and subjective any
information provided by the interrogatee about any matter that is
of moral concern to him. Persons with intense guilt feelings may
cease resistance and cooperate if punished in some way, because
of the gratification induced by punishment.
6. The character wrecked by success is
closely related to the guilt-ridden character. This sort of
person cannot tolerate success and goes through life failing at
critical points. He is often accident-prone. Typically he has a
long history of being promising and of almost completing a
significant assignment or achievement but not bringing it off.
The character who cannot stand success enjoys his ambitions as
long as they remain fantasies but somehow ensures that they will
not be fulfilled in reality. Acquaintances often feel that his
success is just around the corner, but something always
intervenes. In actuality this something is a sense of guilt, of
the kind described above. The person who avoids success has a
conscience which forbids the pleasures of accomplishment and
recognition. He frequently projects his guilt feelings and feels
that all of his failures were someone else's fault. He may have a
strong need to suffer and may seek danger or injury.
As interrogatees these people who "cannot
stand prosperity" pose no special problem unless the
interrogation impinges upon their feelings of guilt or the
reasons for their past failures. Then subjective distortions, not
facts, will result. The successful interrogator will isolate this
area of unreliability.
7. The schizoid or strange character lives
in a world of fantasy much of the time. Sometimes he seems unable
to distinguish reality from the realm of his own creating. The
real world seems to him empty and meaningless, in contrast with
the mysteriously significant world that he has made. He is
extremely intolerant of any frustration that occurs in the outer
world and deals with it by withdrawal into the interior realm.
He has no real attachments to others, although
he may attach symbolic and private meanings or values to other
people.
Children reared in homes lacking in ordinary
affection and attention or in orphanages or state-run communes
may become adults who belong to this category. Rebuffed in early
efforts to attach themselves to another, they become distrustful
of attachments and turn inward. Any link to a group or country
will be undependable and, as a rule, transitory. At the same time
the schizoid character needs external approval. Though he
retreats from reality, he does not want to feel abandoned.
As an interrogatee the schizoid character is
likely to lie readily to win approval. He will tell the
interrogator what he thinks the interrogator wants to hear in
order to win the award of seeing a smile on the interrogator's
face. Because he is not always capable of distinguishing between
fact and fantasy, he may be unaware of lying. The desire for
approval provides the interrogator with a handle. Whereas
accusations of lying or other indications of disesteem will
provoke withdrawal from the situation, teasing the truth out of
the schizoid subject may not prove difficult if he is convinced
that he will not incur favor through misstatements or disfavor
through telling the truth.
Like the guilt-ridden character, the schizoid
character may be an unreliable subject for testing by LCFLUTTER
because his internal needs lead him to confuse fact with fancy.
He is also likely to make an unreliable agent because of his
incapacity to deal with facts and to form real relationships.
8. The exception believes that the world
owes him a great deal. He feels that he suffered a gross
injustice, usually early in life, and should be repaid. Sometimes
the injustice was meted out impersonally, by fate, as a physical
deformity, an extremely painful illness or operation in
childhood, or the early loss of one parent or both. Feeling that
these misfortunes were undeserved, the exceptions regard them as
injustices that someone or something must rectify. Therefore they
claim as their right privileges not permitted others. When the
claim is ignored or denied, the exceptions become rebellious, as
adolescents often do. They are convinced that the justice of the
claim is plain for all to see and that any refusal to grant it is
willfully malignant.
When interrogated, the exceptions are likely to
make demands for money, resettlement aid, and other favors --
demands that are completely out of proportion to the value of
their contributions. Any ambiguous replies to such demands will
be interpreted as acquiescence. Of all the types considered here,
the exception is likeliest to carry an alleged injustice dealt
him by KUBARK to the newspapers or the courts.
The best general line to follow in handling
those who believe that they are exceptions is to listen
attentively (within reasonable timelimits) to their grievances
and to make no commitments that cannot be discharged fully.
Defectors from hostile intelligence services, doubles,
provocateurs, and others who have had more than passing contact
with a Sino-Soviet service may, if they belong to this category,
prove unusually responsive to suggestions from the interrogator
that they have been treated unfairly by the other service. Any
planned operational use of such persons should take into account
the fact that they have no sense of loyalty to a common cause and
are likely to turn aggrievedly against superiors.
9. The average or normal character is not
a person wholly lacking in the characteristics of the other
types. He may, in fact, exhibit most or all of them from time to
time. But no one of them is persistently dominant; the average
man's qualities of obstinacy, unrealistic optimism, anxiety, and
the rest are not overriding or imperious except for relatively
short intervals. Moreover, his reactions to the world around him
are more dependent upon events in that world and less the product
of rigid, subjective patterns than is true of the other types
discussed.
Contents
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