1. The Laws of the ancient Persians
2. Religion and Divinity as the Foundations of Law
3. The State and the Sovereign
4. Administration of Justice
5. The Police organization of the Empire
6. The Ecclesiastical Courts and Their Functions
7. The Iranian people and their great classes
8. The Family
9. Adoption of Children
1) Early Fame of the Laws of the Persians
Although the rulers of the first ancient royal house of Iran have all been distinguished as lawgivers, the first personage to have rendered special service in framing and codifying laws was Prince Uruvakhshaya, the brother of the immortal hero Krsaspa (Garshasp) and the son of King Thrita, the father of medicine. They were the immediate descendants of great Yima, the brilliant antediluvian monarch. This definitely shows that Law started in Iran in the beginnings of human history.
It is apparent that customs and laws would have to be recognised immediately the primitive men formed themselves into social units. Then wise men would appear and give them laws as necessity arose. Hence apparently jurisprudence should have a very ancient history in all annals of humanity, and every civilized nation of antiquity must have had a fair system of laws to guide and govern it.
The Code of Moses is supposed to have followed; but Sparta in ancient Greece probably had the next system of codified law in known history; for, in B.C. 900, Lycurgus, the king of that country, gave his people a new set of laws. In Greece itself Dracon drew up a sever code of laws at Athens in 621 B.C. Solon who followed however gave that state a more humane system of legislation.
Roman laws are said to have started with Romulus who is supposed to have lived about the year 753 B.C. Numa and Servius Tullius were the next Roman legislators. About 451 B.C. the Decemvirs gave Rome laws which were rather rigorous. The Twelve Tables which the Decemvirs had framed continued as standard Roman law until Emperor Hadrian promulgated the Perpetual Edict which was a fair code prepared by the lawyer Salvius Julian. The emperors who followed him gave new codes or imposed new laws, but the principal fame of having given a final shape to Roman law belongs to Justinian, the contemporary of Xosrow the Great of Persia who was more popularly known as Anoshervan. At Justinian's command a commission under the lawyer Tribonian brought out those works of law for which the emperor's memory has been kept fresh up to the present day.
The Books of Law dealt with Court and Magisterial Law, Law of Accusations, Law for Injuries to Person and Property; Laws pertaining to Theft, Misappropriation and Cruelty to Animals; Laws applying to Soldiers and Military Organisations; Church Law, Family Law and Law of Pedigree and Descent; Law applying to Medical Practice; Law of Business Transactions in relation to Property, Animate and Inanimate; Laws relating to Debt and Interest, the other Mutual Obligations; Laws of Purity, Health and Sanitation, Private and Public; Laws applying to the Cultivation of the Soil and Colonizing Schemes; and finally, the Law of the Heavenly Kingdom and the Divine Government of the Universe.
It will thus be seen that the matter dealt with in the following pages is concerned with only a few portions of the above vast field of Law.
So Aim of Law would be to promote Religion and Divinity in Mankind which would be furthered by the Spread of Learning and Knowledge among Men
Law having thus been enthroned by the Zarathushtrians on the lofty pedestal of Religion and Divinity, Farrukh-Mart Vahram, the learned compiler of this work, rightly observes that the aim of Law is to further the Mighty Word of the All-Knowing Creator and to defeat Falsehood, and thus to compass in the end the immortal, the illustrious and the most Brilliant and Perfect Sovereignty of the Kingdom of God. This would be possible, he adds, because Law-abidingness is deeply imbedded in the very nature of Humanity, and so the Divine Being has created the world and implanted man in it to live the Live of Righteous Progress; and this instinct of Law-abidingness is to prove useful and valuable in the distant end by means of knowledge and education, and discrimination and enlightenment and learning.
Thus the great Farrukh-Mart and the enlightened men of Iran of his time acknowledged and followed the wise principle that the spirit of Law-abidingness would progress in the world by educating the masses and spreading learning, enlightenment and science among them. Indeed the world would be the better and the happier if it followed this belief and practice of the ancient Iranians.
While setting the claim of Bahram V to the throne, in deposing Kobad, in deposing Hormaz, for considering whether Bahram i Chubin could be elected to the throne of the Sassanides, and in the impeachment of Xosrow the Conqueror, the Grand Senate had always assembled to decide the issues. It is not clear whether the great Popular Assembly also had always met simultaneously; but there are incidents which show that that great body was the supreme power in the state. The Grand Senate, for instance, had opposed the accession of Bahram V to the throne, but he had got it by the superior vote of the Popular Assembly which had decided in his favour. Similarly when Kobad had listened to maligners and got executed the great hero Sufrae or Sukhrae who had saved the nation from the White Huns, both the army and the people had risen against him and voted for his dethronement, and that vote was fully carried out.
What is still more astonishing is that when the Great King granted public audience in the open to all his subjects on the Nowruz and Mihrigan days, the humblest members of the population had the privilege to present to him petitions and complaints which might be against the highest personages in the Empire including the Sovereign himself. Both by law and by disposition he was most solicitous to see that no was obstructed in doing so, and a herald pronounced the direst consequences to any one attempting such obstruction.
If among the petitions and complaints the Great King thus received, a complaint was presented against himself, he immediately get down from the throne on reading it, took the crown from his head and placed it on the empty throne, and turning to the Supreme Spiritual Lord who sat beside him, handed him the complaint on knees and begged him to hold inquiry in the case and pronounce an impartial judgment. If this was pronounced against the Great King he immediately had to make amends to the wronged party before wearing again the crown and resuming the throne.
While no one was allowed to defy or frustrate the principles of justice, severest penalties were held out to those personages who sat in judgment and violated its sanctify by an intentional miscarriage of justice. This rule prevailed in Iran from the days of the Achaemenian Empire and earlier, and was scrupulously maintained throughout the Sassanian sovereignty.
Not only was the Judge thus warned against an intentional miscarriage of justice, but he was also instructed to maintain with the greatest firmness absolut impartiality in balancing judgment between the parties standing in litigation before him, and not to allow himself to be swayed by the smallest inclination towards any one side. He was thus to cast out all consciousness of self in the judgment seat, and it for strong human reasons and unusual circumstances he felt any prejudice against the accused, he was to pass the case on directly to the higher court, and not handle it himself.
If a party in a case was represented by the lawyer, the judge or the magistrate, as the case might be, was first to be that he was appointed in proper form. He had them to consider whether he had the power to hear the case, and whether a case required an urgent hearing. Even when he had not that power, he could look into the prima facie of the plaint brought before him and could refuse to pass it on to the proper court if he found it groundless.
In cases properly to be tried by his court the judge or the magistrate had to see to the oath being properly administered to the parties. He had to examine the plaintiff or the complainant as to the statement of the grievance and to note down his replies. If in that preliminary inquiry no ground could be seen for drawing up a case against the defendant or the accused, he had to discharge him honourably.
Even when facts appeared quite obvious against the defendant or the accused, the judge or the magistrate had to make out a definite case and hold proper inquiry. He was to assure himself about the identity of the persons and things produced before him, and the extent, manner and circumstance of the commited act, by direct facts as well as evidence. He was likewise to examine identification as to a person's name and deposition before making up a charge. He was also impartially to grant the fair request of any of the parties.
In criminal cases, the magistrate had first to examine the inquiry papers submitted to him and then carefully to examine the time of the act, the time of arrest, the time for which one was kept in custody and the time when he was preduced in court, and whether the case was bailable or not. Thus while he would searchingly examine the parties suing justice, he was equally solicitous to see that the police had not transgressed their powers or were not attempting a miscarriage of justice.
It is noteworthy that judges and all other presiding offices at courts had to forward the judgment papers to the Board of the Lord High Chancellor.
Thus, for instance, when a person would claim a property which another was holding and would use force to eject him from possession, and the other seek the court's help, and the court would order the claimant to stop action until it investigated the two parties respective claims, then the claimant would have to obey that order. The court would also command the assertive claimant to deposit in court an amount as security against his asserting the claim before the court's decision in the matter.
If, notwithstanding the court's order, the claimant would still assert his claim with attempt to eject the other claimant from his possession, that security deposited by him in court would be confiscated. If he still persisted and made a third attempt, his propriety right in the property would be forfeited, if he really had one, or he would otherwise be punished with due severity by the court.
It is apparent that in all other cases of contravention of court's commands, the culprit would always be dealt with in a similar exemplary way.
A lawyer who was appointed after the case had proceeded to some extent, or to replace another, had to take up the case just at the point where it had proceeded. With the appointment of a new lawyer however the client had to take oath a new if the circumstances required it.
Lawyers could not charge their clients excessively and even in prolonged cases of property dispute their fees were not to exceed 22 to 30 per cent of the property's value, although they would be much less in ordinary cases, and only 12 per cent when the property was very small. If a lawyer charged so excessively as 75 per cent of the value of the property in dispute, he incurred a penalty which might be anything up to 18000 Dirhams according to the gravity of the offence.
The police officer was required to know the court procedure for the prosecution of the cases and for advancing accusations and was expected to carry out the court's orders promptly. He had to be prompt in recognizing things necessary for proving a guilt, and was expected to be able to show how a stolen thing came to be with the thief. He was expected to be very careful in the charges he might advance against the accused and about his exact identity.
The Judge or Magistrate, as the case might be, was bound to examine with care circumstances associated with the accusation of a person by the police, such as the time of the act, the time of arrest, the time for which one was kept in custody, and the time when was produced in court, so that if anything unusual or wrong appeared the police might be asked to account for it, and an innocent person might be promptly and honorably discharged if the accusations were found groundless.
Thus while crime was suppressed assiduously, no slackness was shown in seeing that an innocent man did not appear in the dock.
The Church courts tried all crimes against the Church, and also generally dealt with disputes which were purely civil and had no penal aspect, as well as with cases relating to Church and Temple Property, Marriage, including the Sutur kind, Dowry, Divorce, Adoption, Inheritance and Testamentary matters, the applying of Ordeals, etc., and often with cases in which the interest of Slaves was involved. Apparently the ecclesiastical court's jurisdiction would extend only to the religious or purely social aspects of these subjects, for, their worldly circumstances would be dealt with by the ordinary courts only.
The ecclesiatical courts were to be conducted in the same legal form as ordinary courts were. The lawyer's role was generally performed by a Dastur, though ordinary lawyers and attorneys too were allowed to represent or defend cases coming before them.
Thus the population of the Empire would be divided into the Clergy, the Government Servants, the Soldiers, the Office Bearers and Attendants, the Peasant, the Tradesmen, the Artisans, etc. And it is apparent that each class would have special laws applying to the members of their order besidethe general codes. Hence there would be ecclesiastical codes, civil sevice codes, army codes, etc., several of which are distinctly referred to in the summaries of the legal nasks which are given in the Eighth Book of the Dinkart. And, as we have seen above, all these also would be added to, from time to time, by new enactments by the Imperial Legislature and the Decrees of the Great King, which would be notified to the nation by means of the Imperial Gazette.
It will therefore be seen that, notwithstanding the fair volume of law presented in the following pages, it represents only a very small portion of the grand jurisprudence of the ancient Iranians. It mainly deals with social matters, property dealings, and administration of justice, and ecclesiastical courts and administration only.
It appears that although the joint family system thus prevailed, a son of the family could demand his lawful share in the family and establish a separate home of his own. But such son could not succeed the Lord of the House in the family government. It would thus appear that that duty fell on the next eldest son who lived in the joint family as an integral member. The prospective Lord of the Family was known as the Son of the Family and apparently assisted the Lord of the Family in the family government, and would also be assisting the Lady of the House whenever the need arose for doing so. If the Son of the Family happened to be a minor when the Lord of the House died, a Guardian, distinct from the Lady of the House was to be appointed over him safeguard his interests.
Whatever came to the family after its sons had got their inheritance and its daughters had been married and provided their dowry and inheritance, was to go only to the Lady of the House and a posthumous child of the Lord of the Family if one were born after his decease, though a distinct guardian would be appointed over that child in that case. She was also privileged to take over whatever was assigned to the joint family or to the personal family of the Lord of the House in preference to the Son of the Family, and when she would be administering the family estate as the executrix, she alone would be under the responsibility to be sued for a liability of the House even when there were other members in the house.
Both the Lady of the House and the Guardian were administered oaths for the proper discharge of their duties, though sometimes the Lady of the House also became its Guardian, as is said above. When however they were distinct they had to manage the affairs of the house in full harmony, as when engaging an attorney at law for some affair of the house. When however the Son of the Family came of age they were to hand over the control of the general family government to him as he would be the rightful Lord of the House then. The latter was then entitled to dispute any act of theirs which was due to mistake or misunderstanding. As Lady of the House however she and the Son of the Family who would be the new Lord of the House would jointly manage the family affairs, according to their distinct spheres of control in the joint family.
Both parents and children had mutual responsibilities and privileges. The father was bound to use his property first on the needs of his family: and so he could not give it away as gift or in charity if that deprived his wife and children of proper maintenance, and even if he should do so with the wife's sanction law would intervence and prevence him from doing any such thing, so that even if such gift was already made and given away, it was to be withdrawn under the compulsion of law. So again, a father who criminally neglected maintenance and guardianship of his child had to make good the expense to any one else who fulfilled that duty towards it.
If however the father was in want and the wife and children had some property of their own the father was privileged to take a legitimate portion of it for his own use. It is apparent however that this would not be permitted to the extent which would deprive them of their own means of livelihood; whereas when he could avail of such privilege without causing inconvenience to others he had to return in principal what he had thus taken, when he found the means to do so.
Father, as his child's guardian, had the right to decline to allow it a gift by another; but when he allowed it, he had to preserve it intact till the child came of age and took it over.
Once a father had made a gift to his daughter it could not be withdrawn afterwards. But is she simply held a possessory right in the parental home, that was to be passed on to the father on her getting married. And though her claim on father for maintenance and guardianship ceased on her marriage, his guardianship over her was restored on her becoming a widow, and if she had no means of maintenance as should be provided by her deceased husband's estate or household, it is apparent that she would depend on her parents for it.
The parents directly, or the heads of their joint family, had to make provision for the marriage of every daughter who was actually born or whose birth was expected in it. And when there was no other means of providing a dowry for her, it might be got from a gift made by her father to the mother, if such happened to be the case.
It was a wise rule among the ancient Iranians that a daughter could not be compelled to marry against her will, though she was allowed to marry against her parents' will if she chose to do so. She could refuse to marry a husband chosen for her by her father. If she was married in minority in a status which she disapproved on coming of age, her marriage could not be dissolved, but her father's guardianship over her was to be transferred to another person till she was reconciled to him.
A daughter had to discharge a parental debt in proportion to her share in the parental estate, but if she paid it off all by herself, the other legatees would be compelled by law to repay her their shares in the dept.
When however a minor child was not the father's only child he could give it in adoption, though law required that he should himself continue as the child's guardian till it came of age, but if he died in the meantime the adoptive father was allowed to be its guardian.
It would appear that children were given in adoption out of no monetary interest in such transaction, because it seems that instead of taking anything from the adoptive father in return, the real father rather assigned the child some gift which the law required to be returned to him if the child died in minority.
Adoption could be complete or partial only according as the real father gave away all, or reserved some, of his parental rights in the child. But when it was complete and the adopted person had also given consent to the adoption, the adopted person had equal interest in the adoptive father's property as his real children had. This law applied equally to adopted sons and daughters. It is also said that the adopted child assumed a new name in the adoptive family.